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BACKGROUND 
 
Despite countless advances in food microbiology and public health regulations, foodborne illness 
continues to be a major strain on public health outcomes and a costly economic burden. In the 
United States, many agencies are responsible for ensuring the quality of food, both domestically 
produced and imported. States and localities are delegated the responsibility of identifying and 
ensuring sound practices in the latter stages of the food production process, namely the retail 
distribution of food products to consumers.  
Regulatory policies across the nation have only recently incorporated the evidenced-
based principles of hazard risk management (Law, 2003). Still, food-related acute 
gastrointestinal illnesses have remained pervasive in the country, demonstrating the limits of 
existing standards and approaches employed by regulators. Even more recent is the adoption of 
these principles in the retail food domain. The trend has been complemented by transparency 
requirements augmented by technological developments such as the internet and mobile 
applications. Santa Clara County has recently become among the latest jurisdictions to adopt a 
placarding requirement and a searchable website in an attempt to improve compliance with retail 
food safety rules, as well as public health. This paper will attempt to determine whether or not 
the efforts to make inspection data more assessable to consumers has resulted in greater 
compliance with food safety laws by food retailers. 
Problem Statement and Research Question 
 
Foodborne illness remains a critical yet preventable public health issue across the world. Despite 
numerous scientific strides and the formation of international regulatory and coordination 
frameworks, the World Health Organization found that foodborne illnesses sicken 10 percent of 
the world’s population each year (Zuraw, 2015). Just under a half million of these cases are fatal. 
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Zuraw further noted that the actual incidence of such illnesses is much higher, as the vast 
majority of cases go unreported. According to Henson et al. (2006), for each confirmed case of 
foodborne illness there may be over 300 cases that go unnoticed. These illnesses are the result of 
microbial, chemical, and physical contaminants that come into contact with foods and enter the 
food system because of financially motivated gross negligence, poor sanitation infrastructure, 
and the improper preparation and storage of foods (“Foodborne Illness and Germs”, 2018). 
 Although the United States and other developed nations are considered to have safer food 
systems than their developing counterparts, food-related illnesses continue to remain a costly 
public health matter. Published estimates vary dramatically, but the most recent estimate by the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is 48 million cases per year and 3,000 related 
deaths (“Foodborne Illness and Germs”). The profile of disease agents that sicken Americans 
also differs from those that afflict developing countries. Diseases like Cholera and Typhoid 
Fever are considered extremely rare in the Unites States, but Norovirus, non-Typhoidal 
Salmonella, Campylobacter, and Listeria remain rampant (Zuraw, 2015). The costs associated 
with such illnesses are estimated to be up to $72 billion each year (Minor et al., 2015). 
Valuations of the total costs of foodborne illness are comprised of costs related to medical care, 
loss of work time, reputation and liability costs, and the costs of regulation and surveillance 
(Scharff, 2010).  
 According to Ogbu (2015) and Filion and Powell (2009), over two-thirds of foodborne 
illnesses are attributed to retail food establishments. Among food retailers, substandard hygienic 
behaviors and malpractice in food preparation and storage practices are believed to be the most 
critical risk factors for foodborne illness. Retail food employees thus function as critical control 
points in ensuring the acceptability of any food served by an establishment. Establishing and 
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maintaining a robust food safety culture has been a persistent challenge for food retailers due to 
of high turnover rates, low employee motivation, and an unusually high number of non-native 
English speakers (Strohbehn et al., 2014). Greig, Todd, Batleson, and Michaels (2007) found that 
foods that require more intensive and frequent contact for preparation are more likely to be 
contaminated. In a separate study that surveilled restaurant employees, handwashing was only 
completed one-third of the total necessary times (Pellegrino, Crandall, O’Bryan, & Seo, 2015). 
Foodborne illnesses also result from inadequate food preparation and storage practices that lead 
to the proliferation and survival of any pathogens that would otherwise not pose a health risk. As 
Americans continue to increasingly rely on food prepared outside the home, exposure to food-
related health risks will likely continue to correspondingly increase (Talty, 2016). 
 Santa Clara County has not been impervious to problems of foodborne illness. While the 
vast majority of cases go unnoticed, several notable outbreaks have been the subject of numerous 
media reports and lawsuits. One notable case occurred in October of 2015 at a Mexican seafood 
restaurant in San Jose (Nelson, 2015). Over 190 people were sickened with the Shigella, a 
bacterial illness spread through fecal-oral transmission. The outbreak was eventually traced back 
to a single worker who did not properly wash his or her hands prior to preparing the patrons’ 
food. The 2015 outbreak was widely reported in the media due to its scale, but most outbreaks 
and cases go unnoticed and do not garner the same level of attention. Table 1 outlines the 
incidence figures of various types of foodborne illnesses derived from the Department of Public 
Health’s Open Data Portal. As several have noted, reportable cases of foodborne illnesses only 
represent a small portion of the total incidences (Henderson et al., 2006). Further, the County’s 
Department of Public Health did not include the Norovirus total in its dataset; Norovirus 
infections are said to be one of the most common agents of food-related illnesses (Scallan et al., 
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2011). One can thus infer that the Department of Public Health’s dataset does not encompass the 
true extent of foodborne illnesses in the County. 
 
Table 1: Reportable Cases of Foodborne Illness in Santa Clara County 
Disease Type  Annual Figures  
 2015 2016 2017 
Amebiasis 6 16 4 
Campylobacteriosis 494 572 594 
Cryptosporidiosis 20 24 39 
Giardiasis 117 24 39 
Listeriosis 7 5 11 
Salmonellosis (non-Typhoidal) 349 344 340 
Shiga toxin-producing E. coli (STEC) 117 123 140 
Shigellosis 264 151 153 
Typhoid and Paratyphoid Fever 20 11 24 
Vibrio Infections 9 5 22 
Total 1403 1442 1521 
Source: Santa Clara County Department of Public Health, 2018 
Table 1: Confirmed Cases of Foodborne Illness in Santa Clara County 
 In order to address foodborne illnesses in the County and reports of noncompliance with 
State regulations within the County, the Board of Supervisors approved of new requirements that 
food establishments make visible a placard issued by the environmental health inspector 
subsequent to an inspection (Santa Clara County, 2014). The inspection reports, along with a 
numerical score, are also now posted on the Department of Environmental Health’s dedicated 
website. By making inspection information assessable to consumers, county officials hope that 
vendors will follow changing consumer preferences and improve compliance with the State’s 
retail food code (Santa Clara County, 2013). This paper will attempt to answer the following 
question: Has the county’s overhauled food safety program improved compliance with the food 
safety laws among Santa Clara County food vendors? 
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Scientific and Regulatory Development 
Despite the perpetual entwinement of humans and microbes around food, human understanding 
about the existence and nature of such microscopic life only developed in the last 150 years. 
Prior to the emergence of food microbiology, ancient civilizations around the world practiced 
food preservation techniques such as smoking and salting to prolong freshness and delay the 
onset of anything deemed foul to the senses (Anderson, 2011). Others, as indicated in 
Mesopotamian and Abrahamic texts, emphasized the purity and cleanliness of food. Early 
hygienic behaviors related to food resulted from the desires to conform to religious doctrines, not 
a scientific understanding of the contamination of food by disease-causing agents. Early 
regulatory decrees around the consumption and production of certain foods due to illness 
emerged well before the discovery of pathogenic agents. According to Zaccheo, Palmacio, 
Venable, Locarnini-Sciaroni, & Parisi (2017), “the leader of the Byzantine Empire, Emperor Leo 
VI, forbade the eating of blood sausage because of its association with a fatal food poisoning 
now presumed to be botulism” (p. 11). Zaccheo et al. (2017) also noted that it was not until 1683 
when Dutch scientist Anton van Leeuwenhoek first viewed and confirmed the existence of 
microbial life. This discovery would pave the way for Louis Pasteur, now deemed the father of 
food microbiology, to develop the process of pasteurization and contribute to the germ theory of 
disease, alongside German chemist Robert Koch (Oberg, 2012). Pasteur and Koch’s germ theory 
would effectively lay to rest the idea of the spontaneous generation of bacterial life and bring to 
prominence the conceptions of contamination and infection. The scientific advances made by 
Pasteur continue to serve as the basis for contemporary food standards and regulations around 
the world. Food regulatory standards, however, would take decades to adopt this new paradigm 
of microbial contamination (Law, 2003). 
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 Federal efforts to regulate the food industry would only emerge after growing public 
awareness of the unsanitary environments that accompanied the growth of industrial food 
production. According to Law (2003), rapid urbanization and the emergence of industrial 
technology created a rift between food production and consumption; consumers “became 
increasingly reliant on the market exchange for food” (p. 1105). Following numerous outbreaks 
of illness and the publication of Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle, public concern would culminate in 
some of the first federal food safety regulations (Anderson, 2011). Among the earliest notable 
legislative developments were the Pure Food and Drug Act and the Federal Meat Inspection Acts 
of 1906 (Johnson, 2011). Both laws aimed to ensure the quality and integrity of foods produced 
in or imported into the United States. Law noted that subsequent laws, such as the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetics Act of 1936 and the Restaurant Sanitation Program of 1934, would expand 
the scope of the 1906 laws, as well as identify which agencies would have statutory authority to 
carry out enforcement. These early efforts to ensure food safety by the Federal government were 
effective in reducing incidences of Typhoidal Salmonella and Botulism that were rampant in the 
industrial meat packing facilities. However, as Oberg (2012) noted, the scientific advances made 
by Pasteur concerning contamination and germ theory were not reflected in early regulatory 
standards. Oberg further found that many early food regulations were focused primarily on 
efforts to curtail adulteration and fraud, such as mislabeling and the dilution of spirits to 
maximize profits. Any evaluations of the sanitation practices of food producers were based on 
sensory cues, such as the appearance of rotting carcasses or foul odors (Ogbu, 2015). Although 
early food regulations were effective in mitigating large foodborne illness outbreaks, many of 
these earlier standards are today deemed scientifically outdated. 
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 Cotemporary efforts by the federal government in ensuring the safety and integrity of 
foods eaten by Americans is dictated by a number of statutes and overseen by several federal 
agencies. The three primary agencies currently responsible for safeguarding the nation’s food 
supply are the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), and the United States Department of Agriculture (UDSA). The CDC is 
tasked with investigating interstate outbreaks of foodborne illness (Morris, 2017). Surveillance 
activities are also undertaken alongside local governments to prevent any local outbreak from 
becoming a national concern. The FDA’s role in ensuring food safety is statutorily outlined in 
the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (Orberg, 2012). This law ensures the safety and 
integrity of all foods, excluding meat, poultry, eggs, and certain seafoods. Of particular interest 
to this paper is the FDA’s role in promoting retail food safety and hygiene. Retail foods 
transactions are intrastate in nature, so the responsibility of regulating such activities is vested 
with state and local governments (Ogbu, 2015). However, the FDA provides guidance through 
its Retail Food Code to the states; the states, in turn, govern the practices of local regulators 
(“Evolution of Food Safety”, 2012). Finally, the USDA, through its Food Safety and Inspection 
Service (FSIS) program, regulates the production and processing of meat and poultry products. 
While other agencies also take part to ensure the safety of the nation’s food, these efforts are 
ancillary and function as support to the CDC, FDA, and USDA (“Advancements in Public 
Health, 1990-1999: Safer and Healther Foods”, 1999).   
 The FDA’s Retail Food Code provides direction to state governments using the principles 
of the Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) system. HACCP is a not an exacting 
plan to be followed but instead employs a systems-based approach where risks for contamination 
are believed to be encountered and reduced to a level considered satisfactory (Taylor, 2001). 
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Instead of traditional inspections based on an inspector’s evaluation of a food producer during a 
point in time, HACCP guidance directed regulators to examine a producer’s quality control 
processes. According to Sperber and Stier (2009) and Axelrad (2006), HACCP is comprised of 7 
foundational principles used to minimize foodborne risks: 
1. Performance of a hazard analysis to identify points of the production or preparation 
process where risks can be introduced; 
2. Identification of critical control points where the risks can be acted upon; 
3. Outlining parameters, or limits, of the critical control points to decease the likelihood 
of contamination from biological, chemical, or physical threats; 
4. Developing a process to monitor critical control points to ensure that limits are not 
exceeded; 
5. Designing corrective actions that would be introduced in the event that a limit 
assigned to a critical control point is exceeded; 
6. Instituting verification procedures to determine the effectiveness in minimizing the 
occurrence of hazards;  
7. Ensuring that a sound recordkeeping system is in place. 
HACCP is considered a flexible framework that can be and has been applicable to all phases of 
the food production process, including processing and retail preparation (Weinroth, Belk, & 
Belk, 2018). 
HACCP was developed in the 1960s by Pillsbury and NASA during a joint effort to 
minimize the proliferation of pathogens during extended space endeavors (Weinroth, Belk & 
Belk, 2018). However, it was not fully embraced by the federal government and food industry 
until 1993 after an E. coli outbreak hospitalized over 700 and resulted in the deaths of 4 children. 
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Today, HACCP is widely embraced in the United States and across developed nations. The 
FDA’s Retail Food Code, a non-compulsory document established to provide guidance to state 
public health departments, incorporates HACCP’s principles of quality control and risk 
management (Axelrad, 2006). State and local regulatory agencies have been receptive in 
incorporating HACCP into their respective food codes. According to the FDA, there are 66 state 
agencies responsible for ensuring retail food safety throughout the country, and all but two 
agencies have at least partially incorporated the FDA’s Food Code standards into their own 
respective codes (“Adoption of the FDA Food Code by State and Territorial Agencies 
Responsible for the Oversight of Restaurants and Retail Food Stores”, 2016). The California 
Retail Food Code, which governs all county and local retail inspection programs, also employs 
many of the risk-mitigation controls outlined by the FDA Food Code and HACCP.  
The California Retail Food Code was signed into law as SB 144 in 2007 and lays out the 
parameters for local enforcement agencies to follow (“Laws, Policies, and Legal Issues”, 2019). 
The Code outlines the required food safety and preparation standards that are believed to 
minimize the risk of foodborne health risks. According to Ogbu (2015) retail establishments are 
defined in the Code as  
an operation that stores, prepares, packages, serves, vends, or otherwise provides foods 
for human consumption at the retail level. Permanent or nonpermanent food facilities 
include, but are not limited to restaurants, public school cafeterias, restricted food service 
facilities, mobile support units, temporary food facilities, vending machines, and certified 
farmers’ markers. (p. 8) 
Under the Retail Food Code, county governments are the principle entities responsible for 
enforcing the code. However, a few cities, such as Berkeley, have opted to develop their own 
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enforcement programs. The Retail Food Code does not impose a prescribed checklist for 
enforcement agencies to follow. Instead, it broadly outlines the components of retail food 
preparation that are to be inspected; these are the areas where foodborne hazards are most likely 
to occur (Ogbu, 2015). Some examples include evaluations of employee hygiene practices, 
temperature management, and the presence of pests. Also articulated by the Retail Food Code are 
the levels of severity of any findings of non-compliance. Anything deemed an imminent health 
hazard is classified as a major violation, and potential hazards not considered an imminent threat 
are considered minor violations. Any food establishment that is determined to have committed a 
major violation is subject to immediate closure unless a suitable corrective action is taken (Santa 
Clara County, 2013). Environmental health inspectors are tasked with implementing the statutory 
mandates of the State Retail Food Code but use their own judgements to determine compliance 
and the adequacy of any corrective actions taken. Also outlined by State law is the requirement 
that retail food establishments make inspection reports available to consumers (Susko, Putnam, 
& Villareal, 2013). However, the law only requires information to be presented upon request. No 
requirements are imposed on either the local agencies or venders to anticipate consumer requests 
and make the data assessable online or on storefronts (“Excerpt from the California Retail Food 
Code”, 2018). Local enforcement agencies, such as Santa Clara County, also have broad 
discretion to establish their own grading systems, if any.  
Across California, local enforcement agencies responsible for implementing the Retail 
Food Code have each pursued their own grading metrics or systems. According to Ogbu (2015), 
some of the types of placard grading systems found around California include letter grading, 
percentage grading, and color-coded grading. Some of the less populated counties in the northern 
part of the State employ neither a grading system nor a placard posting requirement, but many do 
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make their inspections reports available online. Such placard grading systems are designed to 
convey the findings of the most recent inspection in a succinct and accurate manner to potential 
patrons of a food establishment (Simon et al., 2005). While no research was found on the 
efficacy of one different grading system compared to the others on improving public knowledge 
and health, some have contended that letter grading systems may be more difficult to 
comprehend for English language learners or those not accustomed to letter-based academic 
grading systems (Ogbu, 2015). Systems that use a numeric or percentage-based system, such as 
the one in San Francisco, may fail to convey the severity of any violations discovered. A 
restaurant with one major violation, an imminent health hazard, may have a higher score than 
one with several minor violations (Santa Clara County, 2013). Color-coded systems, such as the 
one used by Sacramento County, are considered to lack nuance, as establishments with an 
excellent record of hygiene and sanitation are grouped together with those that are merely 
satisfactory enough to receive a green card. After careful examination of the various systems, the 
Board of Supervisors chose to develop a dual approach that combines a color-coded placard with 
a numeric score (Santa Clara County, 2014). 
In addition to the State Retail Food Code, the State Food Handler Certification Law of 
2011 also functions as the one of the primary statutory mandates imposed on local food 
establishments. Although not examined in this paper and not directly related to the disclosure 
requirements imposed by the State and County, food safety education and certification measures 
are believed to be a critical safeguard for public health. Credentialing, unlike disclosure 
requirements, is aimed to directly address the knowledge deficiencies of food handlers and 
managers (Ogbu, 2015). Under California’s food handler card law, newly hired food employees 
whose job entails contact with foods are required to attain a food safety certificate within 30 days 
 18 
of being hired (“California Food Handler Card”). Additionally, certified managers are required to 
be onsite and actively engaged in ensuring food handling practices at all times. The certification 
requires three hours of training for employees and can be obtained from an accredited vendor 
either in-person or online. According to one study (Park, Kwak, & Chang, 2010), food safety 
training programs do in fact increase knowledge of the appropriate handling and hygienic 
procedures, but desired shifts in actual workplace behaviors require continuous management and 
education processes beyond the initial training.  
Santa Clara County’s Food Safety Program 
 
Santa Clara County’s efforts to modernize its food inspection program were prompted by a local 
news investigation, as well as the recognition that technology should be leveraged to disclose 
inspection information (Wadsworth, 2013). In 2013, an investigative report by the local NBC 
news affiliate found that a number of food establishments refused to share inspection reports 
when requested, in violation of the State Retail Food Code (Susko, Putnam, & Villareal, 2013). 
At the time of the report, Santa Clara County had no grading system in place and no storefront 
placarding requirements. Consumers were entirely reliant on either the ineffective disclosure 
requirements imposed on establishments, or they were left to undertake a meticulous search for 
the data on the County’s dated website. If the County’s Department of Environmental Health 
(DEH) was notified of such a violation, an inspector would visit the establishment and ask if the 
report was readily available (Santa Clara County, 2013). During the 2013 initial discussion with 
DEH staff, it was concluded that no practical enforcement mechanisms existed; food 
establishments that denied an inspection report to a member of the public would not behave in a 
similar manner when asked by a County official, and no penalties would be levied. In March of 
2013, the Board of Supervisors requested that the DEH begin a feasibility study of instituting a 
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new placard requirement (Santa Clara County, 2014). As part of its initial efforts, DEH would 
consult with a variety of stakeholder groups, including consumer advocates and business interest 
groups (“Placarding and Scoring Program”, 2014). A survey of neighboring jurisdictions was 
also completed by the DEH and Board of Supervisors to compare the various grading systems 
that had been in effect for years. In April of 2014, the Board of Supervisors unanimously 
approved of the Ordinance No. NS-517.86 that required the placing of color-coded placards that 
conveyed the findings of inspections. According to the 2014 Board of Supervisors’ meeting 
notes, the color-coded placard would be complemented by a numerical score which would be 
available on the county’s redesigned DEH website. 
 The system adopted by the Board of Supervisors integrates the risk factor principles of 
the HACCP manifested in the placarding requirement with a numeric scoring system. Under the 
new ordinance, the color-coded placard issued after an inspection corresponds to the presence of 
any major violations found (Santa Clara County, 2014). A green pass placard is issued if no more 
than one major violation is found, and the violation must have been corrected during the time of 
inspection (See Appendix A; “Placarding and Scoring Program”, 2014). A yellow, conditional 
placard indicates two or more major violations discovered; corrective actions must have been 
implemented at the time of inspection in order for a conditional placard to be issued (“Food 
Safety Program – Placarding and Scoring”). Conditional placards require a follow-up inspection 
to ensure that corrective actions undertaken during the inspection are indeed satisfactory. Finally, 
if any number of major violations are discovered and no corrective action can be feasibly taken 
at the time of inspection, the restaurant must be immediately closed and is issued a red closed 
placard. A follow-up inspection may be conducted at the owner’s request once it is believed the 
situation has been rectified. 
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 The numerical scoring system that supplements the color-coded placard requirement is 
based on whether or not an establishment receives any of three distinct violation classifications. 
The three types of violations can each result in a numerical score deduction on an inspection 
report (Santa Clara County, 2013). The scores are not indicated on the storefront placard but 
instead posted on the County’s dedicated website for inspection results (Appendix B). A perfect 
score represents a numerical score of 100, and points are deducted with every violation found; 
the amount deducted will depend on the violation type (“Food Safety Program – Placarding and 
Scoring”). Major violations represent the same imminent health hazards that determine the 
placard color issued and also result in an eight point deduction. Minor violations are those that 
can pose health hazard if not rectified but are not considered imminent threats to public health 
(“Placarding and Scoring Program”, 2014). These violations are each followed by a three point 
deduction from the total score. Lastly, the County deducts two points for each good retail 
practice violation discovered. Good retail practice violations include and consider factors such as 
the general cleanliness of the facility and its active onsite management (Santa Clara County, 
2014). Both minor and good retail practice violations do not affect the color of the placard 
issued.  
The inspection report is completed on a standardized form which lists out the 50 violation 
types (See Appendix C). Along with numerical scores and any violations found, the form 
includes a narrative report and the inspector’s feedback on the staff’s knowledge of best practices 
in food hygiene. With the implementation of the new placarding and scoring program, County 
officials prognosticated that the availability of new information would promote public health by 
incentivizing food vendors to improve their sanitation and preparation processes as a reaction to 
increased consumer information. The literature on transparency regulatory policies and their 
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impacts on behavior changes provides insight into the theoretical bases of such placarding 
programs. With respect to the retail food industry, the literature has been favorable to disclosure 
policies such as the one adopted by Santa Clara County.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Restaurant placarding or inspection transparency programs, such the one in Santa Clara County, 
are reliant on the assumptions that inspections do mitigate and prevent illness, that consumers are 
able to assess the information published, and that food establishments will respond to consumer 
behaviors. Over the years, research on placarding programs has examined each of these elements 
using models of economic incentives and information processing and assessment. The 
conclusions in the body of research that exists do appear to comport with the assumptions that 
serve as the basis for the publishing of inspection data. Moreover, the impacts of inspections and 
disclosures on actual health outcomes do appear to be beneficial. These models together 
comprise what Fung, Weil, Graham, and Faggoto (2004) refer to as the transparency action 
cycle. The subsequent literature cited will examine the nature of each of the causal pathways that 
together serve as the basis for transparency regulations in environmental health.  
 Transparency regulatory schemes are viewed as an emerging, viable policy alternative to 
standards-based regulation and subsidization. It has been noted, however, that the success of 
such policies is not guaranteed to achieve the desired ends of policymakers (Fung, Weil, 
Graham, and Faggoto (2004). Fung et al. (2004) note that such policies either introduce new 
information or make assessable existing information to rectify critical knowledge gaps that 
prevent individuals in a population from making the best possible decisions. They further note 
that cross domains, policymakers have deemed it necessary to protect the public by disclosing 
the relevant streams of information in order to mitigate any associated risks with the decisions of 
concern. The effectiveness of these policies is, though, contingent upon shifts in behavior from 
both the parties involved in evaluating the information, and the parties that either disclose the 
information or that the information concerns (Winston, 2008). If the changes in behavior are 
aligned with the intent of policymakers, the disclosure policy is deemed effective. 
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Inspections and Health Outcomes 
 
While disclosing inspection data is aimed to change the habits of both consumers and food 
vendors alike, policymakers are concerned with maximizing public health outcomes (Jin & 
Leslie, 2003). Inspection policies and processes assume a nexus between the determinations 
made during inspections and actual foodborne-related illness health outcomes; more positive 
evaluations are supposed to correspond to some more positive measure of health. Guidelines and 
statutes, both at the federal and state levels, have increasingly focused on the risk-factors that are 
highly associated with incidence of foodborne illnesses (Ogbu, 2015). Inspections conducted by 
Santa Clara County are in turn focused on these risk-based factors (“Placarding and Scoring 
Program”, 2014). These risk factors are comprised of hygiene practices and facilities 
maintenance, and they are believed to account for 75 percent of reported illnesses (Fleetwood et 
al., 2018). Although many jurisdictions do use risk-based inspections, inquiry into the extent of 
any relationship between inspection results and health poses a significant challenge for 
researchers due to the jurisdictional variations in classifying violations, inspector differences, 
and the dependent variables used to measure health (Yeager et al., 2013). Still, several studies 
have attempted to provide some insight into the efficacy of inspection efforts in promoting better 
health.  
 Several studies have attempted to gauge the impacts of food establishment inspections on 
the incidences of foodborne illness outbreaks by comparing data on establishments where 
outbreaks had occurred to those where none occurred over a given period of time. As previously 
noted, these studies employ varying measures of health risks or outcomes and examine different 
jurisdictions that have adopted their own respective approaches to inspecting food vendors. 
Among the earliest studies examining the extent of any association was a study that examined 
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restaurants in King County, Washington between 1986 and 1987 (Irwin et al., 1989). Irwin, 
Ballard, Grendon, & Kobayashi (1989) examined the scores and violations of restaurants that 
had reported outbreaks of foodborne illnesses, and they compared the data to those control 
restaurants that had no such reports of illness. They discovered that there was indeed a 
heightened risk for contracting a biological foodborne illness among restaurants that received 
lower scores. According to the study, “Restaurants of an overall score of less than 86 were about 
five times more likely to have an outbreak. Restaurants that received an inspection result of 
unsatisfactory or suspended were three times as likely to have an outbreak” (Irwin et al., 1989, p. 
589). Certain infractions that involved not keeping food at a proper temperature and those 
relating to food storage were also found to be statistically significant in their associations with 
outbreaks. Another study that compared inspection reports to illness outbreaks in Minnesota 
from 2005 to 2011 found no relation between illness and overall scores (Petran, White & 
Hedberg, 2012). However, it was found that certain violations were highly likely to be associated 
with underlying pathogen classifications that were behind various outbreaks. For example, hand 
washing violations and inadequate work policies involving employee illness were more likely to 
be found in restaurants that experienced Norovirus outbreaks, while Salmonella outbreaks were 
more likely to occur in restaurants that were cited for improper management of food temperature. 
In contrast, Cruz, Katz, & Suarez’s (2001) retrospective evaluation of Miami-Dade County 
restaurants found no association between overall score and reported outbreaks.  
 Research conducted using data from Los Angeles and the United Kingdom have 
employed different measures to operationalize health outcomes or risks. In their study of food 
establishments in Norther Ireland, Fleetwood et al. (2018) compared compliance scores to data 
from the United Kingdom’s Local Authority Enforcement Management System (LAEMS) and 
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United Kingdom Food Surveillance System (UKFSS), both of which are managed by the 
nation’s Food Service Agency. The databases store information about samples randomly 
collected from establishments and analyzed for pathogens well known to cause foodborne 
illness. If any given sample tested positive for any one agent, the sample was deemed 
unsatisfactory. Compliances scores were then compared to these microbiological determinations. 
Fleetwood and his colleagues discovered that compliance scores are indeed associated with the 
presence of foodborne illness inducing pathogens. Among the Northern Ireland restaurants that 
were examined, with each successive level of compliance, samples that tested positive for 
pathogens were less likely to occur. Fourteen percent of restaurants that were fully compliant had 
a sample that tested positive, whereas those restaurants that were considered “not broadly 
compliant” were 21 percent likely to have a sample that tested positive.  
A separate study by Simon et al. (2005) described Los Angeles’ adoption of publishing 
inspection results and foodborne related hospitalizations in the county. Simon and his colleagues 
compared hospital discharge data prior to and after the County’s adoption of the new placarding 
disclosure program. Although the study does not examine any determinations made by the 
inspector, the study addresses directly the impact of disclosing inspection notices and subsequent 
health outcomes. This avenue of inquiry is something that is directly relevant to the terminal 
goals of Santa Clara County in improving public health outcomes.   
How Disclosed Information is Used by Consumers 
 
In adopting transparency requirements, policymakers are seeking to induce behavioral changes in 
both the party that information is targeting as well as the discloser of the information. As Weil, 
Fung, Graham, & Faggoto (2006) assert, however, the process of introducing information to the 
public to changing the behavior of the discloser can fail at one or more points in the cycle, 
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effectively rendering the entire policy ineffective. For the county’s newly transparency-focused 
food program to achieve its intended ends, the information must be incorporated into the 
decision-making calculus of the consumers patronizing food vendors in the jurisdiction. 
Policymakers requiring the disclosure of such information must consider the constraints on 
information processing capacity and the propensity to rely on information cues to make decisions 
(Henson et al., 2006). Fung, Graham, Weil, & Faggoto (2004) claim that for the information to 
be valuable, it must be comprehensible, relevant to the issue at hand, and proximate to the point 
where the person makes the decision in time or spatially. Research examining the impacts of 
publishing or posting inspection data is sparse, but what has been done does appear to 
substantiate the utility of making inspection data available for consumers to consider and act on. 
 Existing research on the need and demand for readily available inspection data indicates 
that consumers are interested but lack the information to make the most informed decisions about 
which establishments to patronize. Jones and Grimm (2008) found that the public is unanimously 
aware that establishments are subject to inspections by local officials. Within the same sample of 
individuals, 87 percent believed inspection data should be easily assessable before deciding 
where to eat; a plurality identified a score of 90 on a 100-point scale as the minimum acceptable 
score for a restaurant. Dundes and Rajapaska’s (2001) study of college undergraduates found 
similar results but applied to a hypothetical alphabetical grading metric. When presented with the 
opportunity to evaluate an establishment on a numerical or alphabetical scale, subjects in both 
studies indicated preferences for only those that received highly positive evaluations. When not 
equipped with adequate information on restaurant hygiene, consumers resort to using arbitrary, 
less reliable cues, including the number of individuals seen dining and reputational station 
among family and friends (Henson et al., 2006). 
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 In seeking to rectify the information asymmetries consumers face when choosing where 
to purchase food, policymakers assume that the information will be both processed and acted on. 
The research on how consumers use inspection data does support the idea that when consumers 
are provided with comprehensible information that is provided in a manner that is proximate to 
the point of decision-making, the information can be used to seek to minimize risks of foodborne 
illness. Harris, Hanks, Line, & McGinley (2017) found that consumers will process information 
heuristically when confronting a positive score. Conversely, if a score is interpreted as negative, 
the prospective consumer will process any provided information in a systematic manner. They 
add, however, that the placard must be posted in a visible spot and presented in a comprehensible 
manner, consistent with the aforementioned requirements of information to be integrated into an 
individual’s decision-making calculations (Fung, Weil, Graham, & Fagotto, 2004). Henson et al. 
(2006) found that the posting of inspection results was not as salient in the decision of whether to 
dine at a particular restaurant as other visual cues, including perceived cleanliness and number of 
patrons. However, taken together, subjects did report hygiene as a dispositive factor in whether 
or not to dine. 
Disclosure and the Incentives to Motive Changes Among Food Retailers 
  
Once consumers are provided with the information to make informed decisions about the risks 
associated with patronizing a particular establishment, food vendors themselves would ideally be 
motivated by market incentives to change their behaviors to meet shifting consumer preferences. 
In order for the policy change to be deemed effective, behaviors on the part of the disclosers 
need to shift in accordance with the goals of the policymakers (Fung, Weil, Graham, & Fagotto, 
2004). In the case of Santa Clara County’s efforts to provide consumers with more information 
about vendor hygiene, vendors are expected to exercise greater compliance with safety practices 
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and norms as outlined by the State and County (“Placarding and Scoring Program”, 2014). 
Several studies have attempted to gauge the impact of the disclosure of hygiene information on 
vendor practices. The results have indicated that making such information assessable can be an 
effective tool for motivating such changes.  
 Studies attempting to gauge the nature and extent of the response to disclosure policies 
have yielded largely positive results. In their examination of Los Angeles County restaurants in 
1998, Jin and Leslie (2003) found that the implementation of placarding postings did in fact raise 
subsequent scores by 5% (2003). Fielding, Aguirre, & Palaiologos (2001) were led to similar 
conclusions in a study also done of Los Angeles County. A separate study of restaurants in Salt 
Lake City found that the jurisdiction’s launching of a website where inspection results would be 
posted was followed by a decrease in the number of critical inspection violations by up to 30 
percent for some inspection categories (Waters, VanderSlice, DeLegge, & Durrant, 2013). In a 
later study by Jin and Leslie (2009), the perceived salience of restaurant reputation and changes 
following inspection determinations varied by the type of establishment. Chain restaurants 
believed they were less susceptible to critical evaluations by inspectors due to their national 
profiles.  
 Other studies pursue other methods of inquiry to understand the impact of reputational 
incentives on vendor behaviors. According to Makofske (2017), growing ubiquity of social 
media platforms, and informal sharing of relevant information, has become an increasingly used 
tool for consumers in choosing where to spend their money. The same study also notes that 
platforms such as Yelp have partnered with local jurisdictions to post inspection data on their 
websites. Inspection data of Santa Clara County establishments is posted alongside Yelp reviews 
following an agreement between the company and HD Scores, a company that collects such 
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information for public agencies (Yurieff, 2018).  It is not believed, however, that HD Scores has 
a formal partnership with the County to disseminate the information. Rather, the company likely 
obtained the information from the County’s own website. In a separate study, Almanza, Ismail, 
and Mills (2002) examined the impact of media reports of restaurant hygiene on food handling 
behaviors. The study found that they were in fact responsive to media reports on inspection 
records, and subsequent scores were found to increase.  
 The body of literature on the impact of the compulsory disclosure of establishment 
inspection data provides some basis for the adoption of such policies. Existing research covers 
most of the causal pathways identified in the desired transparency action cycle from disclosure to 
potential changes in consumer behavior to shifts towards more positive health outcomes (Fung, 
Weil, Graham, & Fagotto, 2004). From the impact of inspections on mitigating health risks to the 
desired changes to safer food establishment handling practices, the research leads one to believe 
that the aims of policymakers in instituting transparency as a regulatory tool can be effective in 
the area of food safety. Also following an examination of the literature, notable lines of inquiry 
have yet to be undertaken by researchers. This includes studies on the various placard formats 
and the role of other disclosing entities such as Yelp in shaping consumer judgements about 
where to spend their money.  
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METHODOLOGY 
 
In order to ascertain whether or not Santa Clara County’s efforts to modernize its food safety 
program have achieved its intended outcomes, an outcome evaluation served as the most 
appropriate evaluative approach to employ. In their book, Program Planning and Evaluation for 
the Public Manager, Ronald and Kathleen Sylvia noted that articulating the theoretical and 
program goals, inputs, and measures aids in understanding how the program is intended to work, 
as well has how the various components interrelate (2012). In order lay out a program’s 
components to conduct an outcome evaluation, Sylvia and Sylvia suggested the use of a visual 
instrument to succinctly lay out each element of a given program. A logic model will outline 
seven elements of a program: (1) theoretical goals, (2) program goals that are defined by 
program administrators, (3) program functions, (4) identifying intermediate and measurable 
goals that operationalize less actionable program goals, (5) program measures, (6) program 
outcomes, and (7) outcome valence. According to Sylvia and Sylvia, the fourth step, program 
measures, is the stage where any evaluative efforts are determined. In addressing the program 
measures of performance, the proximate indicators are assessed for any shifts in the program’s 
intended direction. Table 2 provides information on each component of the County’s food safety 
program as a first step of the outcome evaluation. 
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Table 2: Logic model for Santa Clara County’s Food Program 
 
Theoretical Goals Program 
Goals 
Program 
Functions 
Proximate 
Indicators 
Selected 
Program 
Measures 
Program 
Outcomes 
Outcome 
Valance 
T1: Ensuring the safety and 
integrity of all foods 
served to patrons of Santa 
Clara County food 
establishments 
G1: Increasing 
compliance 
with the State 
Retail Food 
Code (T1) 
F1: Conducting 
routine and/or 
follow-up 
inspections 
I1: Number 
of reported 
foodborne 
illnesses in 
the County 
(F1-4) 
M1: 
Comparing 
the number 
of 
foodborne 
illnesses 
reported (I1) 
O1: (M1) +/- 
 G2: Minimizing 
the incidence 
of foodborne 
illnesses in 
Santa Clara 
County (T1) 
F2: Issuance of a 
color-coded 
placard 
I2: Number 
of major 
violations 
found (F1), 
(F2) 
M2: 
Comparing 
number of 
major 
violations 
found in 
first year 
versus 
subsequent 
years (I2) 
O2: (M2)  
 G3: Ensuring 
that consumers 
have sufficient 
information 
about an 
establishment’s 
record of 
hygiene and 
food handling 
practices (T1) 
F3: Posting 
inspection 
reports and 
numerical 
scores on 
County DEH’s 
updated 
website 
I3: Number 
of minor 
violations 
found (F1) 
M3: 
Comparing 
minor 
violations 
found in the 
first year 
and 
subsequent 
years (I3) 
O3: (M3)  
  F4: Revoking the 
operational 
permits of any 
establishments 
found to have 
imminent health 
hazards that 
cannot be 
corrected (G1), 
(G2) 
I4: Number 
of closures 
or red cards 
issued 
M4: Have 
the number 
of closures 
increased 
since the 
adopted on 
the new 
placarding 
and scoring 
program? 
(I4) 
O4: (M4)  
Table 2: Logic Model for Santa Clara County’s Food Safety Program 
 As part of the evaluation of Santa Clara County’s Food Safety Program, a quasi-
experimental, longitudinal statistical analysis was used to examine program measures M2 and 
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M3. In order to gauge the effect of both program measures, paired sample t-tests were performed 
in an attempt to answer the following questions: 
a. Are there any statistically significant differences in the proportion of restaurants found to 
have a major violation between 2015 and 2017? 
b. Are there any statistically significant differences in the proportion of food establishments 
found to have a minor violation between 2015 and 2017? 
Although the County adopted the ordinance in April of 2014, the program did not take effect 
until October of that year (Santa Clara County, 2014). Therefore, 2015 was the first full year of 
implementation, and the first time that data from all food establishments in the County are 
available for analysis. Also, 2017 was used as the final year of evaluation instead of 2018 due to 
incomplete inspection data from 2018.  Statistical significance will be determined using the 
standard confidence level of 95%, or a p-value of .05. SPSS version 25 will be used to perform 
both analyses. Due to the limitations of the dataset, analysis on placard colors issued could not be 
feasibly completed. Further, because of the County’s record retention policy of three years, the 
analysis examined Years 1 (2015) and 3 (2017) of the program. The design did not use a true 
pre-test/post-test analysis. The methods employed in answering questions A and B are 
comparable to Ogbu’s (2015) analysis of Alameda County’s adoption of a new hybrid color-
coded and scoring scheme.  However, due to the disparities in how Santa Clara County and 
Alameda County categorize and group infractions, the results generated were not comparable. 
Additionally, like Ogbu’s analysis, the results will also be broken down according to 
establishment type. However, the classification system employed by Alameda County somewhat 
differs from that of Santa Clara County’s.  Both measure size, but the numerical delineations are 
distinct.   
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 Prior to the statistical analysis being performed, the several steps in data collection and 
re-coding were performed. All data was collected through a public records request submitted to 
the Santa Clara County Department of Environmental Health. The data was received in an .xlsx 
format, and included numerical facility identification codes, establishment name, establishment 
type, address, inspection date, each violation found, violation severity, and a violation 
description that corresponds to the labels on the county’s standardized inspection form. For the 
purpose of the analysis, information on an establishment’s address, name, and violation 
description were hidden in the dataset due to the information’s limited utility to perform the 
analysis. A random sample of 382 establishments was drawn from the over 6000 available using 
the tools available on the Microsoft Excel platform. Data was then recoded as a binary 0 or 1 
variable to indicate the presence of major and minor violations to tests hypotheses A and B. 
Finally, the recoded data was transferred to SPSS in order to perform the inferential statistical 
analyses.  To ensure validity, only routine inspection data was used in the sample. Also, only 
establishments with data available for both years were selected. In answering questions A and B, 
this research attempts to answer the broader research question of this paper of whether or not the 
revamped Food Safety Program has improved compliance with food safety laws. 
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FINDINGS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
This study examined 382 of the roughly 6,400 retail food establishments in Santa Clara County. 
The composition of the sample is also presented according to the categories presented in the 
dataset provided by the Department of Environmental Health. Table 3 presents the sample 
demographics and frequencies. As displayed, the County categorizes retail food establishments 
according to their respective sizes, as measured by the number of people employed.  
 
Table 3:  
Sample Demographics of Randomly Selected Establishments 
 N % 
0-5 Employees 235 61.5 
6-25 Employees 109 28.5 
26+ Employees 18 4.71 
Schools 20 5.25 
Total 382 100% 
Table 3: Sample Demographics of Randomly Selected Establishments 
Of the 382 retail food establishments randomly selected, smaller establishments which employ 0-
5 individuals make up over 60 percent. Medium-sized are considered those that have 6-25 
employees comprise just over 28 percent. Larger establishments and schools together account for 
roughly 10 percent of establishments sampled. Grocers are primarily categorized into one of the 
three employee count categories, as many prepare food onsite.  However, those that do not 
prepare food onsite do make up a distinct category, but none were selected to be in the sample. 
Also grouped into the categories which identify number of employers are a variety of other 
establishments including commissaries, health facilities, and markets. Schools, however, are 
included in their own distinct category.  
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Figure 1: Violations Totals by Type: 2015 vs. 2017 
 An examination of the total counts of both major and minor violations shows that both 
categories of violations have decreased between 2015 and 2017. Figure 1 displays the violation 
totals for both 2015 and 2017. Major violations, which are identified by the State Retail Food 
Code as posing imminent threats to public health, decreased overall. The number of minor 
violations discovered in the sampled establishments also saw a modest decrease in 2017 from 
2015. Tables 4 and 5 show violations counts for both 2015 and 2017 and also includes a tally of 
each violation type discovered. The tables also illustrate that certain types of infractions 
discovered during an inspection are either exclusively major, exclusively minor, or either minor 
or major.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Violations Counts by Type: 2015 vs. 2017 
 
For example, if an inspector finds an employee who has a bodily discharge from his or her eyes, 
nose, or mouth, the violation would automatically be categorized as major. The findings of any  
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rodents, birds, or insects can be determined to be either major or minor, depending on the 
infraction’s severity and the inspector’s discretion. A complete list of infractions and their 
designated categorizations can be found in the County’s standardized inspection report in 
Appendix C. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Major Violations 
Discovered: 2015 vs. 2017 
Table 4:  
Major Violations Discovered in 2015 and 2017 
 
Violation Description 2015 2017 Total Change 
Communicable Disease: Did not report, restrict, or exclude 
a food employee 
1 0 1 -1 
Discharge 0 0 0 - 
Food Contact Surfaces Unclean and Unsanitized  53 29 82 -24 
Food not in Food Condition/Unsafe/Adulterated 7 4 11 -3 
Food not Obtained from an Approved Source 1 2 3 +1 
Hands not Clean/Improperly Washed/Gloves not Used 
Properly 
15 9 24 -6 
Hot and Cold Water not Available 7 6 13 -6 
Improper Cooking Times and Temperatures 1 0 1 +1 
Improper Cooling Methods 16 9 25 -7 
Improper Hot and Cold Holding Methods 82 85 167 +3 
Improper Reheating Procedures for Hot Heating 0 5 5 -5 
Improper Shell Stock Tags/Conditions/Display 0 2 2 -2 
Improperly Using Time as a Public Health Control 
Procedures and Records 
9 22 31 +13 
Inadequate Handwashing Facilities: Supplied or Assessable   65 54 119 -9 
Non-compliance with Variance ROP/HAACP Plan 4 0 4 -4 
Observed Rodents, Insects, Birds, or Animals 7 8 15 +2 
Sewage and Wastewater Improperly Disposed 2 4 6 +2 
Total 270 239 509  
Source: Santa Clara County     
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Table 5:  
Minor Violations Discovered in 2015 and 2017 
Violation Description 2015 2017 Total Change 
Food Contact Surfaces Unclean and Unsanitized 81 64 145 -17 
Food not in Good Condition/Unsafe/adulterated 15 12 27 -3 
Hands not Clean/Improperly Washed 26 18 44 -8 
Hot and Cold Water not Available 56 57 113 +1 
Improper Cooling Methods 23 28 51 5 
Improper Eating, Tasting, Drinking or Tobacco Use in Food 
Preparation Area 
14 11 25 -3 
Improper Hold and Cold Holder Temperatures 49 70 119 21 
Improperly Using Time as a Public Heath Control Procedures 
and Records 
10 10 20 0 
Inadequate Demonstration of Knowledge; Food Manager 
Certification 
111 100 211 -11 
Inadequate Hand wash Facilities: Supplied or Accessible 93 93 186 0 
Non-compliance with Consumer Advisory for Raw or 
Undercooked Foods 
2 2 4 0 
Non-Compliance with variance/ROP/HAACP Plan 1 2 3 +1 
Not in Compliance with Shell Stock Tags, condition 7 7 14 0 
Observed Rodents, Insects, Birds, or Animals 48 42 90 -6 
Returned and Reservice of Food 2 0 2 -2 
Sewage and Wastewater Improperly Disposed 8 10 18 +2 
Total 546 526 1072 -20 
Source: Santa Clara County     
Table 5: Minor Violation Totals: 2015 vs. 2017 
 
Hypothesis Tests 
 
In order to further gauge any potential changes in compliance with State law as a result of the 
implementation of the new disclosure measures, statistical analyses and hypothesis testing were 
also employed. As previously discussed, the inferential analysis is comprised of two research 
questions, both of which examine the breadth and likelihood of compliance. Using the standard 
95% percent confidence level, or a p-value of 0.05 to determine statistical significance, the 
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research questions assess compliance by examining data on major and minor violation 
prevalence.  
 
Table 6: 
Summary Table of Dependent T-tests performed on proportions of Santa Clara County Retail 
Food Establishments Sampled Found to have Major (RQ 1) and Minor (RQ 2) Violations 
Violation 
Type 
2015 2017 Change t p-value (Sig.) 
Major .41 .45 -.045 -1.341 .181 
Minor .73 .72 -.008 .266 .790 
Table 6: Summary Table for Inferential Statistical Tests of Proportion of Food Establishments Sampled Found to have Major or 
Minor Violations 
The results of both research questions are presented in Table 6. As displayed the results indicate 
that for both major and minor violations, changes in the likelihood of a given establishment 
having committed either category of infraction are statistically insignificant. Concerning major 
violations, hypothesis test one, the proportion of establishments within the sample having 
committed such a violation modestly increased from 0.41 to 0.45.  However, the shift can only 
be explained by randomness, as indicated by the 0.181 p-value.  Concerning minor violations, 
hypothesis test B, the proportion of establishments found having committed such an infraction 
slightly decreased from 0.73 to 0.72.  Similar to the analysis of establishments and major 
violations discovered, the statistical analysis performed on minor violations did not yield a 
significant result. Thus, any variation in the proportions and likelihood of establishments having 
committed a minor violation can also be explained by random variation. Not surprisingly, the 
proportions of establishments both in 2015 as well as 2017 having committed a minor violation 
are both well above the proportions concerning major violations. This is likely explained by the 
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greater number of minor infraction types and the higher thresholds required for a major violation 
to be recorded by an inspector.  
 In addition to assessing the overall sample with changes in compliance from 2015 to 
2017, analysis was also performed on compliance by establishment category. Categories are 
distinguished in the dataset by size and the results are presented accordingly in Tables 7 and 8. 
 
Table 7: Summary of Dependent Sample t-tests Examining any Changes in Major Violations 
Discovered between 2015 and 2017 by Establishment Type 
Establishment 
Type 
2015 2017 Change T-statistic P-value (Sig.) 
0-5 Employees 0.40 0.46 0.06 1.482 .140 
6-25 Employees 0.43 0.45 0.02 .456 .649 
26+ Employees 0.56 0.44 -0.12 -.809 .430 
Schools 0.20 0.25 0.05 .326 .748 
Table 7: Summary Table for Inferential Statistical Tests Examining Proportions of Sampled Establishments Found to Have 
Committed a Major Violation by Type  
Table 8: Summary of Dependent Sample T-tests Examining Any Changes in Proportion of 
Establishments Found to Have Committed a Minor Violation Between 2015 and 2017 
Establishment 
Type 
2015 2017 Change T-Statistic P-value (Sig.) 
0-5 Employees 0.73 0.74 0.01 .333 .740 
6-25 Employees 0.81 0.78 -0.03 -.684 .495 
26+ Employees 0.68 0.68 - 0.00 1.00 
Schools 0.40 0.30 -0.10 -.809 .428 
Table 8: Summary Table of Inferential Statistical Tests Examining Proportions of Sampled Establishments Found to Have 
Committed a Minor Violation by Type 
As both tables demonstrate, the breadth of change in the number of both major and minor 
violations discovered from 2015 to 2017 for all types of establishments appears to be 
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underwhelming. While there were modest decreases in the proportions of larger establishments 
and schools found to have committed a major violation, the changes appear to be the result of 
random variation and cannot be generalized to the broader population. Interestingly, schools 
were found in both 2015 and 2017 to have better performed than every other category of 
establishments. Table 8 illustrates that the proportions of establishments which have committed 
minor violations also remains largely unchanged. Consistent with the aggregated results 
displayed in Table 6, minor violations were similarly less likely to be encountered than major 
violations for each type of establishment. Also, as with major violations, schools were less likely 
to have committed minor violations. 
 The results of this study attempt to add to the already extensive body of literature on the 
matter of inspection data disclosure and changes in food preparation behaviors. Overall, an 
examination of both the descriptive figures and the inferential analysis returned mixed findings. 
From the 382 sampled establishments, the overall counts of both major and minor violations 
discovered appear to have declined. Conversely, the inferential analysis did not demonstrate that 
establishments as a whole have shifted their behaviors and practices in the manner intended by 
the County.  
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ANALYSIS 
 
Transparency requirements are becoming an increasingly employed regulatory strategy for 
changing private behaviors. As much of the literature discusses, success of such policies is 
contingent on the comprehension and integration of the disclosed information by the intended 
recipients of the information and, ultimately, changes in behavior of the disclosing parties. More 
recently, the compulsory disclosure of information has been considered to be a viable tool in 
minimizing the incidence of foodborne illness and promoting public health. Public policy 
decisionmakers, such as the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors, have approved of 
enhanced disclosure requirements of inspection and violation data to the public, hoping that the 
public will make informed decisions about where to eat. In turn, food establishments in the 
County would theoretically modulate their practices, knowing that consumers are equipped with 
the pertinent information to make informed decisions. As discussed in the review of the 
literature, the results of comparable policies have been mixed. As neighboring jurisdictions have 
adopted comparable initiatives since Santa Clara County approved its own, it is incumbent on 
researchers and public agencies to ensure that their efforts are in fact achieving their desired 
ends. This research paper aims to add to the growing body of literature on enhanced disclosure 
regulatory requirements imposed on food-preparing and food-serving establishments, 
particularly in the State of California.  
 The results from this paper’s efforts to evaluate the impacts of Santa Clara County’s 
enhanced disclosure policies for local food establishments yielded mixed results. The analysis 
was comprised of both a descriptive and inferential analysis and generated conflicting results. In 
examining the descriptive violation totals for both major and minor violations, both violation 
classifications experienced modest decreases from 2015 compared to 2017. In 2015, the total 
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major and minor violations found among the 382 sampled establishments amounted were 270 
and 546, respectively. 239 major violations were discovered in 2017, and 536 minor violations 
were found to have been committed. The analysis was also comprised of inferential hypothesis 
tests which examined the proportions of establishments sampled having committed either a 
major or minor violation. For both major as well as minor violations, any changes in the 
proportions of establishments, or likelihood of encountering one in violation, encountered were 
found to be statistically insignificant. This was also true when the analysis was applied to the 
subcategories of establishments. Although the results of this paper were neither entirely negative 
nor positive, the disclosure requirements are still relatively new. The County will undoubtedly 
continue to modulate any efforts to ensure compliance with State’s Food Code and promote 
public health. Along with ensuring that its new efforts to provide information to consumers are 
effective in promoting public health, other strategies and considerations need to be addressed in 
order to maximize the desired health outcomes. These include the county’s large ethnic 
population, the proliferation of mobile food facilities, and promoting sound management 
practices within food establishments. In order for environmental health regulators to successfully 
mitigate foodborne illness sources, it is imperative for researchers, practitioners, and 
policymakers to further inquire about the nature and extent of their impacts on relevant behaviors 
and outcomes. 
Limitations 
 
In attempting to examine the effects of the County’s efforts to disclose inspection data on 
compliance and performance, several obstacles related to data collection and implementation 
timelines introduce limitations to the generalizability of the study. First, the updated disclosure 
requirements are still a relatively new requirement imposed on local establishments. The 
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requirements, along with the companion website and mobile application, are in year three of 
operation. Three years of data points and inspections may or may not be adequate in undertaking 
any longitudinal analysis of the policy. Secondly, due to the Department of Environmental 
Health’s data retention policy of three years, there is no available inspection data for the pre-
implementation period. Therefore, a true pre-test post-test analysis was not possible to perform, 
and insights into whether or not behaviors and compliance have changed as a result of the 
program could not be gathered. Instead, similar to Ogbu’s (2015) analysis of Alameda County’s 
adoption of comparable disclosure policies, this study was limited to measuring the nature and 
extent of compliance during the period of the policy’s existence. 
Future Areas of Research 
 
Santa Clara County and the broader Silicon Valley are believed to be experiencing a burgeoning 
food scene, and some have attributed this to the area’s ethnic and immigrant population. The 
County is home to a disproportionate number of Asian residents compared to national and State 
level data (“Quick Facts: Santa Clara County, California”). Latinos are more prevalent in Santa 
Clara County than nationwide, but slightly less than Statewide. While this may present numerous 
opportunities for tourism and economic development, the prevalence of ethnically owned or 
themed establishments will likely continue to present challenges to mitigating foodborne 
illnesses.  It should be noted that the nature of the relationship between ethnic establishments and 
ethnic populations is not precisely known, but it can be reasonably inferred that the relationship 
is positive.  Further, no such data exists on the number of ethically-run food establishments in the 
County. None of the data provided by the Department of Environmental Health contains 
information of such a nature. The research has been fairly consistent, however, that ethnically 
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managed food establishments have a higher propensity to experience foodborne illness outbreaks 
(CDC, 2012).  
 The literature on ethnic food handling norms, inspection performance, and outbreak 
incidence presents a challenge that needs to be taken into consideration by local policymaking 
bodies, such as those in Santa Clara County. While various explanations for why ethnic 
populations present such a challenge for environmental health professionals, some of the 
possible sources include language factors, the use of niche ingredients and equipment, and foods 
that are subject to intensive manual preparation (Harris, Murphy, DiPietro, & Rivera, 2015). In 
Quinlan’s (2013) analysis of the FDA’s FSNet food surveillance system, it was found that ethnic 
minorities experience higher rates of foodborne illness across most bacterial or viral sources. 
Patil, Cates, and Morales (2005) found that overall knowledge of food handling best practices 
was lower among ethnic Americans than their Caucasian counterparts. Concerning inspection 
scores and evaluations, ethnic restaurants were found to have performed significantly lower than 
non-ethnic establishments (Roberts, Kwon, Shanklin, Liu, & Yen, 2011). The body of research 
implicates ethnically-operated establishments as a notable and growing source of foodborne 
illnesses. In order to address this factor, the county will be best served to adopt a much more 
concerted and targeted strategy in addition to the disclosure regulations. 
 In efforts to target ethnic establishments, the county would need to undertake a more 
extensive and culturally competent campaign to educate local operators and employees. In a 
discussion on the matter, Harris (2016) noted that cultural outreach and educational efforts 
concerning food preparation and oversight practices must take into account the perceived 
position of the targeted population within the broader local society and its dominant culture, and 
the role of food within that particular culture. Promoting standardization in managerial and 
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preparation practices is also believed to be disproportionately absent from ethnic establishments, 
and instilling such practices would considerably benefit owners’ bottom line and also serve to 
promote public health (Quinlan, 2013). 
 Another issue that has increasingly vexed local policymakers has been the proliferation of 
mobile food facilities, or food trucks. These facilities have been an increasingly ubiquitous 
element of urban living and provide a more affordable business model compared to traditional 
brick-and-mortar establishments (Kaufman, 2018). Food trucks have grown at a rate of 7.2 
percent in the last five years, far outpacing the 2 percent growth in traditional establishments 
(“What Data Can Tell Us About the State of the Food Truck Industry”, 2017). Research is sparse 
on the implications this phenomenon may have on public health, and data on the numbers of 
food trucks operating within Santa Clara County was not included in the dataset used in the 
paper. The county, however, has been well aware of the trend and has explored various options 
to monitor and regulate these establishments. In one report, the county conceded that mobile 
food facilities are not subject to the same regulatory processes as traditional establishments 
(“Mobile Food Facilities”, 2018). The challenges in regulating and inspecting such facilities stem 
from the irregular routes and venues many food trucks serve. While traditional “roach-coach” 
facilities that regularly serve construction sites and business parks have been the predominant 
mobile food facilities in the past, the newer business model of specialty trucks that do not follow 
an itinerary and only announce their locations through social media have been a larger source of 
concern for regulators (“Oversight of Food Truck Operations by the Department of 
Environmental Health”, 2013). This has made conducting unannounced inspections on such 
operations challenging for Department of Environmental Health staff. Social media and GPS 
tracking have been proposed as solutions to confronting these emerging challenges, but no 
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substantive actions have been taken since they were evoked in the 2013 Civil Grand Jury Report. 
As the specialty mobile food facility market expands, county officials and the Board of 
Supervisors should return to devising solutions to ensure that these producers are satisfactorily 
complying with the regulations and best practices related to retail food preparation and service .  
 In seeking to encourage greater compliance with the State Retail Food Code and 
maximizing public health outcomes, local officials must also consider the managerial nuances 
and unique challenges of the industry. As previously noted in the discussion, retail food 
establishments account for most outbreaks. Within that subset of outbreaks, employee hygienic 
practices were reported to be a factor in many of these cases (Harris, 2016). An examination of 
the literature shows that undesired behaviors on the part of employees can be largely attributed to 
low motivation, demographic and language barriers, and high turnover (Pellegrino, Crandell, 
O'Bryan & Seo, 2014). Literature on disclosure policies, particularly pertaining to the retail food 
industry, does not address how transparency impacts employee actions. Such regulatory actions 
target ownership and management, but the extent to which their subsequent impacts trickle down 
to and permeate everyday employee deliberations is unknown. It appears to be more likely that 
such top-down approaches motivating behavioral changes are misaligned with the dynamics of 
the industry. The efficacy of mandatory training certifications such as California’s Food Handler 
Card Law have also been questioned, as the lax certification requirements entail that certification 
courses do not optimally impart the knowledge necessary to execute food handling and hygienic 
best practices and change behaviors (Park, Kwak & Chang, 2010). One approach suggested by 
industry experts has been the development and fostering of a positive food safety culture. As 
Wan and Marterer (2018) noted, the development of a food safety culture will allow for best 
practices to “become a normal way of doing things and a source of personal pride…Inspections, 
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audits, and testing are all necessary, but they identify problems after the fact and depend on fear 
of detection and penalties to incentivize compliance”(¶ 3). 
Conclusion 
 
Disclosure policies have been an increasingly viable and cost-effective regulatory strategy.  In 
the realm of retail food safety, such policies have been increasingly adopted in recent years in 
efforts to increase food safety behavior performance and minimize foodborne illness cases. 
While the research on such policies has been mixed, Santa Clara County has been among the 
recent wave or jurisdictions to adopt such policies. This paper attempted to examine the extent of 
food safety related behavioral changes as measured by inspection performance metrics outlined 
by the State Retail Food Code and implemented by the County Food Safety Program. The results 
generated from the descriptive and inferential analyses show mixed results in performance 
changes from 2015 to 2017. While overall violation counts decreased, the breadth of compliance, 
or the proportion of establishments in violation, remained largely unchanged. Still, the program 
provides new information to consumers that was not available prior to the adoption of the 
enhanced requirements. This paper was not without its limitations, but it provides additional 
avenues for research that must be considered for the county be successful in mitigating 
foodborne illness. 
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